South Carolina Law Review
Volume 37

Issue 2

Article 6

Winter 1986

Election of Remedies in South Carolina
Mary Donne Peters

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peters, Mary Donne (1986) "Election of Remedies in South Carolina," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 37 :
Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Peters: Election of Remedies in South Carolina

NOTE
ELECTION OF REMEDIES IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The new South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure' will alter
existing state law concerning the doctrine of election of remedies.2 In South Carolina, the election of remedies doctrine is
complex and multifaceted-it defies attempts to provide a simple, single definition.3 The doctrine's effects are, however, pain1. The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure became effective July 1, 1985. For a
discussion of the sweeping changes effected by the adoption of the new rules, see H.
LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVn. PROCEDURE (1985). See also Flanagan &
Sloan, Selected Issues Under the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 S.CL. REv. 265
(1986).
2. The election of remedies doctrine originated under a Roman law forbidding a
person to accept a benefit under a will and later refuse to carry out the will's mandates.
See Note, Election of Remedies: A Delusion?, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 293 (1938)(surveying 1400 cases addressing the law on the election of remedies). Modern interpretations of
the doctrine provide that a party who chooses one of two available inconsistent remedies
may not later pursue the other. Fraser, Election of Remedies: An Anachronism, 29 OKLA.
L. REv. 1, 1 (1976). Further, when two inconsistent remedies exist for the redress of a
single wrong, a party may be forced to elect between the two. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.5 (1973).
Prior to adoption of the new South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Circuit Court
Practice Rule 78 was the procedural mechanism used to force an election. This rule
provided:
No motion to require the plaintiff to elect as to which cause of action alleged in the complaint he will rely on shall be made, unless previous notice
thereof in writing, stating the grounds, is given not less than four days before
the hearing. But if such notice be given the motion may be heard upon the call
of the case for trial or at any time prior thereto.
S.C. CI. CT. PRAcT. R. 78.
3. For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court has required an election of
"remedies" when a party asserted two separate causes of action. See Scott v. McIntosh,
167 S.C. 372, 166 S.E. 345 (1932); infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. The supreme
court has also characterized election of remedies as a choice between different forms of
redress afforded by law for the same injury. See Tzouvelekas v. Tzouvelekas, 206 S.C. 90,
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fully clear for many litigants. Prior to adoption of the new rules,
parties faced with a motion to elect were forced to choose among
several available causes of action 4 or several remedies5 at a very
early stage in litigation. The alternative pleading provisions in
the rules will eliminate the need to elect between causes of action at the pleading stage of a trial.6 Additionally, the rules will
probably forestall the requirement of an election of remedies at
an early stage of litigation. This article will examine existing
South Carolina law concerning election of remedies and explore
the probable changes to this doctrine under the new rules.
II.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A.

Definition

Over the years a number of courts in South Carolina have
attempted to define the phrase "election of remedies." In 1932,
for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated: "'The
doctrine of election of remedies applies only where there are two
or more remedies all of which exist at the time of election, and
which are alternative and inconsistent with each other, and not
cumulative, so that after the proper choice of one, the other or
others are not available.' -7 In a more recent discussion, the supreme court defined election of remedies as "'a choice between
different means of redress afforded by law for the same injury,
or different forms of proceeding on the same cause of action.' ,8
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also attempted to
define many of the expressions used in its analyses of the election of remedies doctrine. In fact, the outcome in many cases
has turned upon what constitutes an inconsistent remedy,9 a sin-

33 S.E.2d 73 (1945).
4. See Scott v. McIntosh, 167 S.C. 372, 166 S.E.2d 345 (1932).
5. See, e.g., Thompson v. Watts, 281 S.C. 504, 316 S.E.2d 393 (1984); Landvest Assocs. v. Owens, 276 S.C. 22, 274 S.E.2d 433 (1981).
6. See RULE 8(e)(2), SCRCP; infra notes 99-125 and accompanying text.
7. Scott v. McIntosh, 167 S.C. 372, 373, 166 S.E. 345, 345 (1932)(quoting 9 R.C.L.
Election of Remedies § 3 (1929)).
8. Thompson v. Watts, 281 S.C. 504, 507, 316 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1984)(quoting
Tzouvelekas v. Tzouvelekas, 206 S.C. 90, 94, 33 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1945)).
9. See, e.g., Thompson v. Watts, 281 S.C. 504, 316 S.E.2d 393 (1984); infra notes 2226 and accompanying text.
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gle injury, 10 or a single cause of action."" The court has, at various times, construed the same term broadly 2 and narrowly 3 to
achieve different results.
Ebner v. Haverty FurnitureCo.' 4 contains one of the more
useful definitions of the election of remedies doctrine. The supreme court in Ebner distinguished two situations in which a
plaintiff may be met with an election of remedies objection. In
the court's first example, the plaintiff alleged certain facts to invoke one remedy, but in a later action alleged different, contrary
facts and sought a different remedy. In the second example, the
plaintiff alleged the same facts in two proceedings, but sought a
different remedy in each.' 5
The Ebner court characterized the first situation as "a case
of 'election of remedial rights,' [rather] than a case of 'election
of remedies' .. . ."I" The court explained: "A remediable right
is a legal conclusion from a certain state of facts; a remedy is the
appropriate legal form of relief by which that remediable right
may be enforced."'" The court stated that the "forbidden" inconsistency lies not in the remedies a plaintiff has invoked, but
rather "in the different statements of fact, the different remediable rights asserted by him in the respective actions."'" The court
also provided a rare insight into the reason for the doctrine's
existence:' 9 a party who asserts different statements of fact offends the truth seeking function of the court. Thus, "the law, in

10. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967); infra notes
27-31 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Landvest Assocs. v. Owens, 276 S.C. 22, 274 S.E.2d 433 (1981)(defining
a cause of action as a primary right possessed by the plaintiff and a corresponding duty
devolving upon the defendant). For a discussion of the parameters of a cause of action in
the context of cases concerning res judicata and collateral estoppel, see Stewart, Res
Judicataand CollateralEstoppel in South Carolina, 28 S.C.L. REv. 451, 453-65 (1977).
12. See Tzouvelekas v. Tzouvelekas, 206 S.C. 90, 33 S.E.2d 73 (1945).
13. See Landvest Assocs. v. Owens, 276 S.C. 22, 274 S.E.2d 433 (1981).
14. 138 S.C. 74, 136 S.E. 19 (1926).
15. Id. at 77, 136 S.E. at 20.
16. Id. at 78, 136 S.E. at 20.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Few modern opinions have cited the policies underlying the election of remedies
doctrine. A federal trial court in New Jersey, however, indicated that the doctrine's purposes are threefold: "to prevent double recoveries, forum shopping, and harassment of
defendants by dual proceedings." Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251,
1256 (D.N.J. 1983), aft'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1984).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1986

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1986], Art.[Vol.
6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

37

the interest of honest pleading, will hold him estopped or barred
by his first complaint, from pursuing a different remedy based
upon a repugnant state of facts."20 The court then concluded
that the second situation presented a "pure case of election of
remedies." 21
B. Application of the Doctrine
Most South Carolina cases addressing the election of remedies issue fall into one of the two categories described in Ebner.
Nevertheless, sharper distinctions in definitions and a few unusual cases expand to six the number of areas in which the
South Carolina Supreme Court has required an election of
remedies.
1. Inconsistent Remedies Sought for One Remediable Right
In Thompson v. Watts,22 a buyer of corporate shares
brought an action alleging a violation of the Uniform Securities
Act2" coupled with an action for fraud and deceit.2 4 The parties
agreed to proceed on the fraud and deceit action first, after the
defendant objected that the causes of action were improperly
joined. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant on the
fraud and deceit action. The trial judge then granted the defendant's motion for a summary judgment on the Uniform Securities Act allegation, holding that the plaintiff had elected his
remedy when he agreed to pursue the fraud cause of action.25
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the summary
judgment. The court noted that in the securities action the
plaintiff buyer sought recission of the contract and return of his
consideration, but in the fraud action sought affirmance of the
contract and actual and punitive damages. The court stated that
although a party may bring suit alleging both a securities violation and common-law fraud and deceit, he must seek consistent
20. 138 S.C. at 78, 136 S.E. at 20.
21. Id.
22. 281 S.C. 504, 316 S.E.2d 393 (1984).
23. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (1976 & Supp. 1984).
24. 281 S.C. at 505-06, 316 S.E.2d at 394. The plaintiff in Thompson also alleged
wrongful ouster, but that cause of action was not relevant to the appeal. Id.
25. Id. at 506, 316 S.E.2d at 394.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss2/6

4

1986]

OF REMEDIES
Peters: ELECTION
Election of Remedies
in South Carolina

remedies. Thus, even though the plaintiff's fraud and deceit action was unsuccessful, his pursuit of that action constituted an
election to affirm the contract and, thus, barred his later efforts
to repudiate the contract and recover his consideration.26
Central to the court's finding that inconsistent remedies
may not be pursued in the case of a single actionable wrong was
the determination that only one remediable right existed. Isolating a single remediable right, however, is often difficult and may
provide a trap for the unwary plaintiff. Despite this hardship,
the supreme court has, on several occasions, looked beyond the
face of the pleadings and concluded that a plaintiff's version of
the facts gave rise to only one remediable right.
In Jacobson v. Yaschik,27 the seller of corporate stock sued
the buyer of that stock, who was the corporation's president as
well as a director and majority shareholder. The seller's complaint alleged two causes of action. First, the complaint charged
that the defendant sold the stock at a price in excess of what he
paid the plaintiff. Under this cause of action, the plaintiff sought
an accounting and recovery of the difference between the price
the defendant received for the stock and the price he paid the
plaintiff. In the same cause of action, the plaintiff also maintained that the defendant's prior contract to sell the stock was a
fraudulent concealment in violation of his duty to her as a fellow
shareholder. She therefore sought a pro rata share of the full
value of the stock received by the defendant. In the second
cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's concealment of the prior sales agreement amounted to fraud, and
she sought actual and punitive damages. 8
The court in Jacobson concluded that although the form of
the plaintiff's complaint stated two causes of action, only one
action was actually present. 29 The court stated:

The sole wrong for which the plaintiff attempts to recover
against the defendant is that, while the parties were in a fiduciary relation, the defendant contracted to sell her stock at a
price in excess of that which he had contracted to pay her and

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 507, 316 S.E.2d at 395.
249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967).
Id. at 580-81, 155 S.E.2d at 603.
Id. at 586-87, 155 S.E.2d at 606.
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in failing to inform her that he had so contracted.30
Characterizing the situation as one cause of action, the supreme
court determined that the plaintiff had to choose between the
equitable remedy of an accounting for the loss sustained by the
defendant's fraudulent conduct and the legal remedy of actual
and punitive damages for fraud. 1
In a recent decision the South Carolina Court of Appeals
employed a novel analysis to determine whether a single cause of
action existed. In Boardman v. Lovett Enterprises,2 limited
partners sued defendants who allegedly induced them to enter a
limited partnership by fraudulent representations and omissions. Plaintiffs alleged several causes of action, including the
following: (1) a fraud action, seeking actual and punitive damages, based upon misrepresentations and omissions stemming
from a pro forma financial statement; (2) an action for actual
and punitive damages for alleged waste from excessive and unauthorized management fees charged to the limited partnership;
and (3) an action based upon fraudulent misrepresentations and
omissions, in which the plaintiffs asked the court to dissolve the
limited partnership, appoint a receiver to take charge of partnership assets, impress the partnership property with a trust, and
require the defendants to make a full accounting of the partnership's affairs. 3
The court of appeals noted that each cause of action in
Boardman relied upon a pro forma financial statement given to
the plaintiffs by the defendant.3 4 The court concluded that since

30. Id. at 586, 155 S.E.2d at 606.
31. Id. at 587, 155 S.E.2d at 606. The South Carolina Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion in Landvest Assocs. v. Owens, 276 S.C. 22, 274 S.E.2d 433 (1981), in
which limited partners brought an action against a general partner to recover alleged
hidden profits from the sale of real estate by the general partner to the partnership.
Plaintiffs alleged in their first cause of action that they were entitled to an accounting
under S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-540 (1976). The second cause of action alleged fraud and
sought money damages. The supreme court held that the plaintiffs had to elect either
the equitable or the legal remedy because their complaint stated only one cause of action. The primary right discerned by the court was "the [plaintiffs'] right not to be subjected to a hidden profit from one owing them fiduciary duties." Id. at 25, 274 S.E.2d at
434.
32. 283 S.C. 425, 323 S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1984). For a discussion of Boardman, see
Practiceand Procedure,Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 37 S.C.L. Rav. 165, 188-

89 (1985).
33. 283 S.C. at 426-27, 323 S.E.2d at 785.
34. Id. at 428, 323 S.E.2d at 785-86.
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all of the alleged problems arose from this single document,
there was only one primary wrong and the plaintiffs were entitled to only one recovery. 35 Thus, an evidentiary link prevented
the plaintiffs from successfully asserting the separate causes of
action.
In contrast to the cases discussed above, an earlier South
Carolina Supreme Court case defined the parameters of a cause
of action in a manner more favorable to plaintiffs. In
Tzouvelekas v. Tzouvelekas, 8 the plaintiff asserted two causes
of action. In one he alleged that the defendant had sole title to
certain property;3 7 in the other he alleged that he himself held
title to the same property.3 8 The supreme court refused to force
an election because the plaintiff was able to support each cause

consistent facts and because he
of action with different 3and
9

sought only one recovery.
Tzouvelekas is, arguably, distinguishable from Jacobson
and Boardman because the plaintiffs in the latter two cases did
not isolate separate, compatible facts to support each of the
causes of action alleged. This factual alignment for causes of action, however, will not guarantee success for a plaintiff. Rather,
practitioners must be aware that even if a plaintiff convinces the
court that separate causes of action are present, the court may
still find that the remedies sought are inconsistent and force an
election upon that ground.4 °

35. Id., 323 S.E.2d at 786.
36. 206 S.C. 90, 33 S.E.2d 73 (1945).
37. Id. at 92-93, 33 S.E.2d at 73. The plaintiff, conceding that his wife held legal
title to a certain house and lot, sought to have the property impressed with a constructive trust on the ground that her conduct barred her from ascertaining any right or title
to the property. Id.
38. Id. at 93, 33 S.E.2d at 74. In his second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that
he was the owner of a note which was secured by a purchase money mortgage executed
by the defendant on the same property. The plaintiff sought foreclosure of the mortgage.
Id.
39. Id. at 94-95, 33 S.E.2d at 74. The court stated that it was obvious that if the
plaintiff succeeded at trial in having the property impressed with a trust, there would be
no point in proceeding with a mortgage foreclosure action because the lesser estate would
merge into the greater estate. Id. at 95, 33 S.E.2d at 74.
40. This election is based on the principle that a plaintiff is not entitled to a double
recovery. The courts may refuse to permit a plaintiff both to rescind a contract and
recover his investment and to assert that the contract is in force and recover damages
thereon. See, e.g., Hipp v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 92 (D.S.C.
1968), afl'd per curiam, 412 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1969)(plaintiff could not rescind insurance contract and then later sue defendant insurer for fraud); Spencer v. Nat'l Union
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2. Inconsistent Actions Alleged
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also applied the
election of remedies doctrine to force an election between inconsistent causes of action. In Scott v. McIntosh," the supreme
court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and held that the
plaintiff should have been required to elect, before trial, between
two contradictory causes of action.42 The plaintiff in Scott sued
the defendant warehouse owner, alleging causes of action based
upon a violation of a written lease agreement and upon a theory
of quantum meruit.4 The court maintained that an election was
required because "the evidence necessary to establish the one
differs from that necessary to establish the other. The two
causes are inconsistent, and the defendants were put to a disadvantage 4 by permitting the plaintiff to go to trial on both
causes."

Dean Harry M. Lightsey of the University of South Carolina
School of Law has criticized the result in Scott, asserting that
the decision failed to distinguish between inconsistency of remedies and inconsistency of causes of action:
The two doctrines should not be confused. The modern, liberal
trend which allows alternative pleadings seems far more preferable, since often a party may not be in a position, at the pleading stage of a case, to know precisely what the facts are....
[A]Iternative inconsistent remedies should not be allowed since
to do so would, in substance, authorize a double recovery. The
parties should not be put to such an election, however, until
after the conclusion of the trial of the case, at which stage
there should be sufficient information upon which
to meaningfully decide which remedy should be pursued.45
Scott may be limited in its application today, however, as
courts move in the direction suggested by Dean Lightsey. The
South Carolina Court of Appeals recently rejected the blurring
Bank of Rock Hill, 189 S.C. 197, 200 S.E. 721 (1939)(recovery of real estate in suit for
specific performance of sales contract precluded recovery of general damages for breach
of contract).
41. 167 S.C. 372, 166 S.E. 345 (1932).
42. Id. at 375, 166 S.E. at 345.
43. Id. at 373-74, 166 S.E. at 345.
44. Id. at 375, 166 S.E. at 345.
45. See H. LIGHTSEY, SOUTH CAROLINA CODE PLEADING 242 (1976).
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of distinctions between an election of remedies and an election
between causes of action. 46 Furthermore, the decision in Scott
has apparently not been extended to instances in which a petitioner alleges mistake in selecting an initial cause of action 47 or

when an earlier action did not result in a final adjudication of
the merits.48
In Thackston v. Shelton,49 a case decided only three years

after Scott, the court demonstrated its willingness to avoid the
harsh effects of Scott in certain situations. In Thackston the
plaintiff attempted to assert two causes of action. First, he
brought suit on a bond signed by the defendant in an attachment proceeding against a car that the defendant sold to the
plaintiff. Second, he asserted a tort cause of action for fraud and
deceit at the time of the sale.50 The supreme court found that
the trial judge, by sustaining a demurrer on the ground that the
two causes of action were improperly joined, did not rule upon
the sufficiency of the causes of action. Thus, although an election between two inconsistent rights extinguishes the right not
elected, no "true election" occurred in this case. 51 Consequently,
"the effect of going to trial on the second cause of action was no
the
greater than an Amendment of the Complaint by omitting
52
first cause of action and is not a case of true election."
The supreme court, however, has not always been so lenient
in characterizing an earlier unsuccessful action in a manner that
would permit a later suit on the same facts. In Babb v. Paul
Revere Life Insurance Co.,55 for example, the trial court required the beneficiary of an insurance policy to choose between
an action alleging fraud, which would negate the policy's exis-

46. See Boardman v. Lovett Enters., 283 S.C. 425, 427-28, 323 S.E.2d 784, 785 (Ct.
App. 1985); supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Smithco, 241 S.C. 451, 128 S.E.2d 915 (1962); Lafitte v.
Tucker, 216 S.C. 201, 57 S.E.2d 255 (1950). But see Hipp v. Kennesaw Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 92 (D.S.C. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 412 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir.
1969)(refusing to permit plaintiff to rely on mistake theory).
48. See Jones v. South Carolina Power Co., 198 S.C. 380, 18 S.E.2d 336 (1941)(involuntary nonsuit in first action alleging trespass did not preclude later condemnation
action).
49. 178 S.C. 240, 182 S.E. 436 (1935).

50. Id. at 242, 182 S.E. at 438.
51. Id. at 244-45, 182 S.E. at 438.
52. Id. at 245, 182 S.E. at 438.

53. 224 S.C. 1, 77 S.E.2d 267 (1953).
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tence, and an action seeking to reinstate the policy. 54 The court
found that the beneficiary, through an earlier decision to proceed on the fraud claim, had abandoned her claim for recovery
in any cause of action that might have accrued under the
5
policy. 5
3. Inconsistent Facts
6 the supreme court repeated the
In White v. Livingston,"
5
proscription, laid down in Ebner v. Haverty Furniture Co., 7
against subsequent actions alleging facts that differ substantially
from factual allegations in previous suits. In a prior unsuccessful
action, the plaintiff in White sued his sister, alleging fraud in
the conveyance of a deed. The plaintiff then filed a second suit,
alleging that the item he conveyed to his sister was actually a
mortgage.58 The supreme court adopted the trial judge's holding
that "[u]nder the rule in the Ebner case, . . . the mere filing of
the complaint in the first action 'estopped or barred' plaintiff
from maintaining this action. A fortiori, the prosecution of it to
judgment did so."' 9 This use of the election of remedies doctrine
may be indistinguishable from the equitable defense of
estoppel.60

4. Jumbled Complaint
A motion to elect a remedy is a harsh penalty for an inartfully drafted complaint; yet several older South Carolina
cases have forced just such an election."1 A motion to elect in

54. Id. at 5, 77 S.E.2d at 269.
55. Id. at 8, 77 S.E.2d at 270.
56. 234 S.C. 74, 106 S.E.2d 892 (1959).
57. 138 S.C. 74, 136 S.E. 19 (1926). See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
58. 234 S.C. at 76, 106 S.E.2d at 893.
59. Id. at 80, 106 S.E.2d at 895.
60. See McMahan v. McMahon, 122 S.C. 336, 115 S.E. 293 (1922)(election of remedies is really application of the law of estoppel); Abdallah v. Abdallah, 359 F.2d 170, 174
(3rd Cir. 1966)(adopting language from McMahan characterizing election of remedies
doctrine as a form of estoppel). But see Myers v. Ross, 10 F. Supp. 409, 411 (S.D. Fla.
1935) (distinguishing the election of remedies from estoppel on ground that a party seeking to force an election need not show that he will be harmed if opposing party is not
compelled to abide by his first election).
61. See Hodges v. Bank of Columbia, 130 S.C. 115, 125 S.E. 417 (1924); Jumper v.
Dorchester Lumber Co., 119 S.C. 171, 111 S.E. 881 (1922).
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those instances was timely if made before the reading of the
pleadings.2 Recent South Carolina cases, however, have not
of remedies based on the ground of a jumbled
forced an election
3
6

complaint.

5.

Two Separate Actions Seeking the Same Relief

In Greenwood Manufacturing Co. v. Worley,'4 defendant
Worley successfully asserted a counterclaim against the plaintiff
and recovered damages that included expenses to renovate and
equip a building, to purchase merchandise, and to compensate
for personal services. Subsequently, in Worley v. Greenwood
Manufacturing Co., 65 Worley brought a suit directly against

Greenwood Manufacturing Co. and sought essentially the same
recovery." The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's demurrer in the second suit on three grounds, including
"elected the remedy of counterthe finding that Worley 6had
7
action.
first
the
in
claim"
The Worley court apparently sought to prevent the plaintiff
from recovering damages more than once for the same cause of
action. The court deemed it unnecessary, however, to explain
the exact basis for the decision, but merely stated: "The result
62. Hodges v. Bank of Columbia, 130 S.C. 115, 118, 125 S.E. 417, 418 (1924); Ruff v.
Railroad Co., 42 S.C. 114, 118, 20 S.E. 27, 29 (1894).
63. No South Carolina Supreme Court decision has forced an election by the plaintiff on the grounds of a jumbled complaint since Hodges v. Bank of Columbia, 130 S.C.
115, 725 S.E. 417 (1924). Moreover, in Barnwell Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Hartzog, 231 S.C.
340, 98 S.E.2d 835 (1957), the court stated:
Where, as here, several remedies are available to the plaintiff, it is he, not
the defendant, who may choose which of them he will pursue; and the court, in
construing a complaint in such case suggestive of more than one theory, will
sustain the theory intended by the pleader, if it be supported by the allegations, and will reject as surplusage allegations not in harmony with it.
Id. at 347-48, 98 S.E.2d at 839. The court in Barnwell observed that because the plaintiff
sought only one remedy for each cause of action alleged, the issue presented was not one
of election of remedies, but rather of construction of the plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 350,
98 S.E.2d at 840.
64. 222 S.C. 156, 71 S.E.2d 889 (1952).
65. 223 S.C. 249, 75 S.E.2d 298 (1953).
66. Id. at 250, 75 S.E.2d at 298.
67. Id. at 251, 75 S.E.2d at 298. The court stated that the demurrer had been sustained "upon the several grounds that the instant plaintiff had elected (and successfully
pursued) the remedy of counterclaim in the first action, could not split his cause of action and that the controversy would be res judicata upon finality of the judgment upon
the counterclaim in the first action." Id.
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of the judgment under review is so obviously just and proper
that examination of the various grounds of it in order to determine which, or whether more than one, of them is more appropriate of application than another, is unnecessary.""6 '
6. Statutory Interpretation
Failure to comply with statutory procedures may also result
in a finding of an election of remedies. In Fisher v. South Carolina Department of Mental Retardation,"' the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that a claimant who had entered into a settlement in a tort action without regard to her employer's statutory rights of subrogation and without complying with provisions of the South Carolina Worker's Compensation Law,70 made
an election of her available remedies and could not subsequently
maintain a worker's compensation claim. 71
The court in Fisher acknowledged that the worker's compensation law did not specifically provide that a settlement with
a third party without the employer's consent would constitute
an election of remedies. The court concluded, however, that the
legislature did not intend to permit a claimant to settle his
rights against a third party without regard to the employer's
statutory right of subrogation and still maintain a worker's compensation claim. The plaintiff who ignored the statutory guides
was thus held to have made an election of remedies and to have
"waived" any rights under the South Carolina Worker's Com72
pensation Law.
68. Id. at 251, 75 S.E.2d at 299.
69. 277 S.C. 573, 291 S.E.2d 200 (1982).
70. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -650 (1976).

71. See S.C. CoDE ANN. § 42-1-560 (1976)(establishing procedure for a worker seeking to assert a claim against a third party). Writing for a unanimous court in Fisher,
Justice Ness outlined the following three possible remedies for a plaintiff who alleged a
job-related injury: proceeding solely against the employer, proceeding solely against the
third party tortfeasor under § 42-1-550, or proceeding against both the employer and the
third party tortfeasor by complying with § 42-1-560. 277 S.C. at 575, 291 S.E.2d at 201.
72. 277 S.C. at 575-76, 291 S.E.2d at 201. Waiver is not synonymous with estoppel.
In South Carolina, equitable estoppel is established when a party shows the following
circumstances: (1) he was ignorant of the truth of facts in question; (2) the party to he
estopped made representations or engaged in conduct that was misleading, (3) reliance
on the representations or conduct; and (4) prejudicial change in position resulting from
this reliance. Crescent Co. of Spartanburg v. Insurance Corp. of N. Am., 266 S.C. 598,
604, 225 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1976)(citing Pitts v. New York Life Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 545, 552,
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The supreme court recently provided a procedural device to
soften the harsh effects of its decision in Fisher. In Talley v.
John-Mansville Sales Corp.,73 the plaintiffs faced a dilemma. If
they brought products liability actions against asbestos manufacturers, they would be barred by the Fisher rule from seeking
worker's compensation. On the other hand, if plaintiffs waited
until they were disabled before filing a worker's compensation
claim, their third party actions would be barred by the statute of
limitations.7 ' The court in Talley resolved this problem by requiring the trial judge to order a stay in the third party suit
pending resolution of the worker's compensation issue.75
C.

Unsuccessful Attempts to Force an Election

Judicial authority in South Carolina enables a party, 76
under certain circumstances, to defeat an attempt to force an
election of remedies. At least three theories have been developed
to prevent the harsh results that an early election would
produce.
148 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1966)). Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Bonnette v. State, 277 S.C. 17, 18, 282 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1981).
Other courts have associated the election of remedies doctrine with the concept of
waiver. See, e.g., J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Rice, 152 Wis. 8, 139 N.W. 445
(1913)(no election of remedies found in mortgage foreclosure case). The Rice court indicated that although there can be no waiver without intent to waive, such intent may be
presumed when a party chooses one of two plainly inconsistent remedies. Id. at 9, 139
N.W. at 446.
73. 285 S.C. 117, 328 S.E.2d 621 (1985).
74. Id. at 119, 328 S.E.2d at 622. The court noted that asbestosis, the illness allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs, is a progressive disease that may be diagnosed many years
before it disables its victims. The statute of limitations for an action against the asbestos
manufacturers would generally begin to run from the date of diagnosis. Id. at 119, 328
S.E.2d at 622.
75. Id. at 119, 328 S.E.2d at 623. The court ordered that a stay be issued until one
of the following occurred: (1) the plaintiffs became disabled and the Industrial Commission could take jurisdiction; (2) one or more worker's compensation carriers accepted
liability; (3) the plaintiffs moved for the stay to be lifted; or (4) the legislature acted. Id.
at 119, 328 S.E.2d at 623. In a footnote the court acknowledged that the stay could delay
the resolution of the actions for years, but asserted that the delay was necessary to avoid
"the inequity created by Fisher." Id. at 119 n.2, 328 S.E.2d at 623 n.2.
76. The doctrine of election of remedies may be used against defendants as well as
plaintiffs. See Pamplico Bank & Trust Co. v. Prosser, 259 S.C. 621, 193 S.E.2d 539
(1972)(defense of fraud and deceit was not barred by earlier fraud and deceit action
because no inconsistent factors were alleged and no final judgment had been rendered in
the earlier suit).
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1. Mistake
Generally, the South Carolina Supreme Court has been willing to permit a party who mistakenly and futilely pursued one
remedy to seek another remedy at a later time.7 In Lancaster v.
Smithco,7 1 the court stated:
It is well established that the choice of a fancied remedy and
the futile pursuit of it, because either the facts turn out to be
different from what the parties supposed them to be, or the
law applicable to the facts is found to be other than supposed,
does not bar the party from thereafter invoking the proper
remedy.7 0
The court's reasoning was simple: "If the party has no such remedy as he invokes, his action in pursuing it does not constitute
an election."8' 0
In Montalbano v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford,
Connecticut,8 ' the supreme court applied the mistake theory
and rejected the defendant's assertion that the election of remedies doctrine precluded a second suit by the plaintiff. In the first
action, the plaintiff sued his insurer in magistrate's court to recover benefits under an insurance policy for his dog's poisoning.82 On appeal, the supreme court found that parol evidence
had been improperly admitted and reversed a jury verdict for
the plaintiff. 83 In the second trial in circuit court, the plaintiff
sought to reform the insurance contract. The defendant objected, claiming that by filing the first action, the plaintiff had
84
elected his remedy.

The supreme court refused to apply the election of remedies
doctrine. The court noted that because of the parol evidence
rule, the plaintiff only had one remedy-equitable reformation
of the contract. Therefore, he could not have made an election in
the first suit; he merely "mistook" his remedy. Because he had
77. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
78. 241 S.C. 451, 128 S.E.2d 915 (1962).
79. Id. at 458, 128 S.E.2d at 919.
80. Id.
81. 218 S.C. 367, 62 S.E.2d 829 (1950).
82. Id. at 368, 62 S.E.2d at 829.
83. Id. (citing Montalbano v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 217 S.C. 157,
60 S.E.2d 77 (1950)).
84. 218 S.C. at 368-69, 62 S.E.2d at 829-30.
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instituted the first action in magistrate's court, a forum without
equitable jurisdiction, he had been prevented from amending his
original complaint to seek reformation. 5
Montalbano demonstrates the court's willingness to stretch
the mistake theory to prevent hardship for a party facing an
election of remedies claim. It is unclear, however, to what extent
a plaintiff after Montalbano may claim "mistake" to defeat a
motion to elect in a second action if the trial judge in a prior
action found crucial evidence inadmissible. 6
The supreme court has not always been generous in applying the mistake theory to assist a party facing a motion to elect.
In White v. Livingston,7 for example, the plaintiff claimed that
an earlier suit alleging fraudulent inducement to sign a deed did
not preclude a second suit alleging that he had conveyed only a
mortgage to the defendant. The plaintiff argued that he had
merely mistakenly pursued a remedy that was not available to
him. 8 The supreme court, however, adopting the trial judge's
order, rejected this contention. The court stated that the plaintiff's mistake lay not in his choice of remedy, but rather in his
inability to prove the facts underlying his claim for relief.89 The
supreme court in White apparently drew a distinction between a
subjective, actual mistake regarding the availability of a cause of
action under a particular set of facts and a strategic miscalculation in the selection of a cause of action to fit the facts of the
case.90 This distinction may prove troublesome in future cases.
2. No Final Determinationon Merits of Prior Suit
In Jones v. South Carolina Power Co.,91 the supreme court
held that an involuntary nonsuit in a prior action based on a
trespass theory was not a determination on the merits and,

85. Id. at 370-71, 62 S.E.2d at 830-31.
86. At least one earlier South Carolina case accepted the mistake theory after key
evidence in an earlier trial had been held inadmissible. See Jones v. South Carolina
Power Co., 198 S.C. 380, 18 S.E.2d 336 (1941).
87. 234 S.C. 74, 106 S.E.2d 892 (1959).
88. Id. at 76-77, 106 S.E.2d at 893.
89. Id. at 77-78, 106 S.E.2d at 894.
90. The court concluded that the plaintiff was barred from pursuing the second
remedy because it was based on facts inconsistant with those required to support the
first. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
91. 198 S.C. 380, 18 S.E.2d 336 (1941).
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therefore, did not bar the plaintiff from pursuing a subsequent
action for condemnation. The court noted that in his first action
the plaintiff pursued a "mistaken remedy" because the defendant had permission to enter the property and could not, therefore, be liable for trespass.9 2 The court also stated that when, as
in Jones, a prior action has not reached final adjudication, the
election of remedies doctrine will not apply if the plaintiff has
not gained an advantage in the first suit or caused a detriment
or change in the defendant's position.9 3
3. Different, Compatible Facts Support Separate Causes of
Action and Only One Recovery Is Sought
As previously noted, 4 the South Carolina Supreme Court
has permitted a plaintiff seeking a single remedy to allege inconsistent causes of action in the same complaint if separate, compatible facts are established to support each theory of recovery.
In Tzouvelekas v. Tzouvelekas,95 the court stated that separate
causes of action supported by separate facts may not be alleged
if they are "inherently repugnant and contradictory." 98 In that
case, however, the court found that the plaintiff's two causes of
action, alleging that the same property was subject to both a
mortgage and a trust, were conceptually compatible.9e The court
thus permitted both claims to be brought in one action to "avoid
a multiplicity of suits, expedite disposition of the litigation, and
minimize costs."98

92. Id. at 387, 18 S.E.2d at 339.
93. Id. at 387-88, 18 S.E.2d at 339-46. Thus, the election of remedies doctrine is
related to the doctrine of res judicata. See United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S.
290, 301 (1922) ("The doctrine of election of remedies and that of res adjudicata are not
the same, but they have this in common: That each has for its underlying basis the
maxim which forbids that one shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause.").
94. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
95. 206 S.C. 90, 33 S.E.2d 73 (1945).
96. Id. at 94, 33 S.E.2d at 74.
97. Id. at 95, 33 S.E.2d at 74.
98. Id. at 96, 33 S.E.2d at 74-75.
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THE NEW SOUTH CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.

Pleading in the Alternative

Among the changes effected by the new South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure is the adoption of pleading in the alternative. Rule 8(e)(2) states:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a cause of
action or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one
count or defense or in separate counts or defenses . . .. A
party may also state as many separate causes of action or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based
on legal or equitable grounds or both.99

The note following rule 8(e) indicates that the measure does not
change South Carolina practice and does not allow "jumbling"
of two or more causes of action in one count. 10 0 The very wording of the rule, however, suggests that changes in the law of election of remedies are inevitable. In Scott v. McIntosh,'0 ' for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court forced the plaintiff to
select one of two alternative, conflicting causes of action before
proceeding to trial on the merits of the case. 0 2 Under rule
8(e)(2), however, causes of action may be pleaded regardless of
consistency.
B.

Timing of Election

Although the new rules permit pleading in the alternative,
plaintiffs will surely still be allowed only a single recovery. Thus,
trial courts will require plaintiffs, at some point, to elect a remedy in order to prevent a double recovery. The key issue under
the new rules will probably be the timing of this forced election.
Because the rules were patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, federal case law construing rule 8 of the federal

99. RULE 8(e)(2), SCRCP (emphasis added).

100. The note to rules 8(e) and 8(f) states: "Rules 8(e) and 8(f) substantially restate
[S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-15-40, -20 (1976)] and are no change to state practice. This rule
does not allow 'jumbling' of two or more causes of action in one count." RULE 8(e), (f),
SCRCP advisory committee note.
101. 167 S.C. 372, 166 S.E. 345 (1932).
102. Id. at 375-76, 166 S.E. at 345-46. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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rules 103 may help predict at what stage such an election will be
required. Practitioners may also seek guidance from the timing
requirements formulated in the case law developed under the
old South Carolina Circuit Court Practice Rules.
1. Federal Court Treatment of Election of Remedies
Generally, federal courts applying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in South Carolina cases have been unwilling to force
plaintiffs to make an election of remedies at an early stage in the
trial. In Cooley v.Salopian Industries,0 for example, a federal
district judge held that the plaintiffs were entitled to proceed
under both a tort theory and a contract theory at the trial on
the merits of the case.1 05 In rejecting the defendant's motion to
force an election, Judge Hemphill criticized the use of that motion in federal courts: "The motion to elect is inappropriate.
This is a federal court, and not a state court. The mischieveousness that grew up around the doctrine concerning the election of
inconsistent remedies was jettisoned with the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on January 3, 1938. " 108
Occasionally, however, federal courts in South Carolina have
applied the doctrine of election of remedies at an early stage. In
Hipp v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Insurance Co.,107 for exam-

ple, a federal district court judge held that the plaintiff's actions
prior to trial constituted an election of remedies that prevented
a suit for alleged fraud and deceit. 08
Before filing suit, the plaintiff in Hipp demanded that his
insurer cancel additional insurance he had purchased and rein103. Federal rule 8(e)(2) states:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately
or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of
them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A
party may also state as many claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal, equitable, or maritime grounds. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
F.R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
104. 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974).
105. Id. at 1116.
106. Id.
107. 301 F. Supp. 92 (D.S.C. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 412 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1969).
108. 301 F. Supp. at 94.
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state the savings account that, under his orginal policy, had been
used to pay the premiums for the additional insurance. The insurer complied with the insured's demands.109 The district court
then refused to permit the plaintiff to seek damages for alleged
fraud in inducing the purchase of additional insurance. The
court explained:
Plaintiff's letter, demanding the recission of the questioned transaction, represented a "decisive act," indicating an
unequivocal election on his part; and, when his demand was
acceded to by the defendant and he was restored to his former
status under his original contract, he had made an effective
election of remedies, precluding him from suing in fraud and
deceit.110
Although they reached different conclusions, Cooley and
Hipp can be reconciled. The court in Cooley refused to force an
election before the merits of the case were decided. 1 1 The court
did not address the issue of whether, upon resolution of the merits of the case, the plaintiff would then be forced to choose between two incompatible remedies. In Hipp, however, the plaintiff had, in a sense, recovered on the contract claim before
trial-the policy was rescinded, and he was returned to his former position. Thus, the federal courts apparently have recognized South Carolina law concerning the substance of election of
remedies, but have been unwilling to require a plaintiff who has
not yet recovered on a claim to choose between possible causes
of action.
2. South Carolina Case Law on the Timing of a Motion to
Elect
In South Carolina a motion to require an election of remedies is an affirmative defense that is waived unless raised in the
defendant's answer.1 When a plaintiff seeks remedies both at
law and in equity and it is clear that both remedies pertain to

109. Id. at 93.
110. Id. at 94. The quoted language suggests that the court interpreted the plaintiff's pre-trial actions as a waiver of the right to seek damages for fraud. On waiver and
election of remedies, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
111. 383 F. Supp. at 1116.
112. Edwards v. Johnson, 90 S.C. 90, 102, 72 S.E. 638, 643 (1911).
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the same cause of action, an election may be forced at any stage
in the proceeding. 113 The plaintiff, however, will not be required
to elect until after the defendant has answered. 114

In Riddle v.

Pitts,115 the

South Carolina Supreme Court re-

fused to find that a plaintiff made a binding election at a pretrial conference during which he told a judge that he would
"probably" proceed under one of the two available causes of action.11 6 The supreme court agreed with the trial judge that unless the defendant made a motion to require the plaintiff to
elect, the plaintiff's pretrial responses did not constitute a bind17
ing election.
The election in Riddle was, strictly speaking, between available causes of action rather than remedies. In the past, however,
the supreme court has labeled similar forced choices as elections
of remedies." 8 While it is unclear whether this categorization
still applies today, Riddle may, by analogy, provide a useful precedent for parties faced with an election of remedies.
The supreme court in Riddle provided another clue for determining the moment when a party may be forced to elect. The
court refused to find that the trial court had erred, even though
the plaintiff had been permitted to elect at the close of evidence." 9 The court failed to indicate, however, whether the trial
judge could have required an earlier election.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has provided clearer
guidance on whether the post-evidence forced election is
mandatory or permissive. In Robert Harmon and Bore, Inc. v.
Jenkins,20 the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in

113. Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 587-88, 155 S.E.2d 601, 607 (1967).
114. Id. at 588, 155 S.E.2d at 607.
115. 283 S.C. 387, 324 S.E.2d 59 (1984).

116. The parties in Riddle stipulated that during the pre-trial conference a judge
other than the trial judge told the plaintiff that he would be required to elect. Id. at 388,
324 S.E.2d at 60.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text. The South Carolina Court of
Appeals has refused to label as an election of remedies a situation in which the defendant sought to force the plaintiff to elect between causes of action. See Boardman v.
Lovett Enters., 283 S.C. 425, 323 S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1984); supra notes 32-35 and
accompanying text.
119. 283 S.C. at 388, 324 S.E.2d at 60.
120. 282 S.C. 189, 318 S.E.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1984). For another discussion of this

case, see Contracts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 37 S.C.L. Rav. 57, 66-68
(1985).
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forcing the plaintiff to elect between causes of action before the
plaintiff was able to determine which ground of recovery he
would be able to prove. 21
The Jenkins court stressed that the separate grounds of recovery must be consistent. 122 The new South Carolina Rules of

Civil Procedure, however, clearly state that inconsistent claims
may be asserted.1 23 Despite this conflict with the mandate of the
new rules, Jenkins liberalized existing law by providing a plaintiff with the invaluable opportunity to observe the development
of evidence at trial before being forced to choose a cause of action. Jenkins also appears to contradict Scott v. McIntosh, 2 ' an
early South Carolina case that permitted a defendant to employ
the election of remedies doctrine, on similar facts, to force the
plaintiff to elect before trial between alternative causes of
1

action.

25

C. Demands for Relief in the Alternative
Dean Harry M. Lightsey has argued that demands for relief
in the alternative should be a necessary corrollary to alternative
pleading. A plaintiff, he asserted, should be permitted to seek
the same relief from one or more parties on the grounds that one
or the other was liable. The pleader should also be entitled to
seek one of alternative remedies depending on which cause of
action is pursued.1 28 The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, has not been willing to permit alternative remedies, even
when alternative causes of action are stated.
In the recent case of Thompson v. Watts, 1 27 the supreme

court noted that a plaintiff may properly bring suit alleging both
a securities violation and a cause of action for common-law
fraud and deceit, but cautioned that the remedies the plaintiff
seeks must be consistent. The court concluded that once the
121. 282 S.C. at 198, 318 S.E.2d at 376.
122. Id.
123. RULE 8(e)(2), SCRCP.

124. 167 S.C. 372, 166 S.E. 345 (1932). See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying
text.
125. Id. at 375, 166 S.E. at 346. In both Jenkins and Scott, the election was between
quantum meruit and breach of express contract.
126. H. LIGHTSEY, SOUTH CAROLINA CODE PLEADING 71 (1976).

127. 281 S.C. 504, 316 S.E.2d 393 (1984). See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying
text.
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plaintiff in Thompson pursued his fraud and deceit action, he
elected to affirm the contract and was, therefore, barred from
seeking to repudiate the contract and recover his consideration
12
under the securities violation.

In the wake of Thompson and the subsequent adoption of
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, it is unclear
whether a plaintiff may plead inconsistent remedies. The parties
in Thompson agreed to proceed first with the fraud and deceit
action, and the jury found for the defendant on that cause of
action. 129 Although a plaintiff should, arguably, be permitted to
pursue inconsistent remedies until the issue of liability is settled, language in Thompson stating that a plaintiff must "seek"
consistent remedies' 30 suggests otherwise.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure add a new
layer of complexity to the already complicated case law on election of remedies. The new rules will certainly permit alternative
claims within a single suit. Less certain are whether inconsistent
remedies will be permitted at the pleading stage and at what
stage the court will force an election of remedies.
Clearly, a plaintiff should not be permitted to recover twice
for a single wrong; a double recovery would punish the defendant twice and provide a windfall for the plaintiff. On the other
hand, the plaintiff should be permitted to assert alternative demands for relief during the liability phase of a trial. An "election" of remedies could be made at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence or when the finder of fact returns a verdict in
the plaintiff's favor. Special verdict forms could be used to prevent confusion over which cause of action a jury considered meritorious.' 3 ' The new South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
128. Id. at 507, 316 S.E.2d at 395.
129. Id. at 506, 316 S.E.2d at 394.
130. Id. at 507, 316 S.E.2d at 395.
131. See also Mendelsohn, Election of Remedies and Settlement-New Lyrics to
an Outworn Tune, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 367 (1980). Mendelsohn suggested that adoption of
a subrogation procedure might prevent the possibility of double recovery and, thus, obviate the need for the election of remedies doctrine. Mendelsohn asserted that a subrogation procedure would allow one who paid a claim, which was not in fact owed, in an
earlier proceeding to recover that amount in a later proceeding. Id. at 401-03.
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may, perhaps, alleviate the harsh results that have sometimes
arisen from a mechanical application of the doctrine of election
of remedies.
Mary Donne Peters
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